Author: Rob McKenzie
Summary
On May 9, 1970, UAW President Walter Reuther, his wife, and four others died in a plane crash involving a private jet in northern Michigan. Months later, the NTSB issued a report stating that the crash was caused by the pilot’s inability to see the ground lights and that the altimeter was likely reading 225-250 feet too high. No public hearing was held, and the FBI did not conduct an investigation. Walter’s brother, Victor, and his daughter, Elisabeth, never believed the crash was an accident. Newly discovered documents provide solid evidence indicating that the crash was an assassination. The manner of Reuther’s death requires a reexamination of him and his time. The manuscript is 30,000 words.
Excerpt
THE ASSASSINATION OF WALTER REUTHER
And The Fate of U.S. Labor
Four passengers converse in the dim cabin area light of a Learjet 23 during the nighttime flight from Detroit to a small airport in northern Michigan near the city of Pellston. The group included Walter Reuther, 62, president of the United Auto Workers union, his wife May Reuther, 59, renowned architect and Reuther family friend Oskar Stonorov, 64, and Reuther’s bodyguard and May’s nephew, William Wolfman, 29. Captain George Evans, 48, is flying the chartered private jet, and the co-pilot is Joseph Karaffa, 40. At 20 miles out from the Pellston airport, Evans talks with the Federal Aviation Administration Flight Service Station specialist Thomas Sorrick, the only person working there that evening. They reviewed the weather, which was light rain and some wind. Evans notifies Sorrick that he will choose a runway approach upon arrival. When the craft reached the small airport, Evans began to circle the airport to land at an illuminated runway opposite their approach path for unclear reasons. That illuminated runway was the only one without flashing Runway End Identifying Lights, forcing Evans to rely on his altimeter to determine the jet’s altitude.
As the craft nears the approach to the runway, it begins its descent. The pilot monitors his altimeter as they near the runway. At 9:33 p.m., the jet aircraft clipped the top of a large elm tree, sucking into its two engines debris composed of limbs and branches. At 145 m.p.h. this causes a flame-out. The aircraft sailed another ½ mile in the air before it crashed into a pine forest, exploding on impact. It erupts into a blaze of flames, and everyone on board is killed.
So ended the life of legendary labor leader Walter Phillip Reuther. Four days after the May 9, 1970, crash, the Veterans’ Memorial Building in Detroit was opened for mourners to pay their respects. People from around the world, including Europe, Australia, and South America, joined the rich and poor, black and white, old and young, who trooped past Walter’s wooden casket adorned with the UAW emblem. Around 3,400 invited guests attended the farewell ceremony, while thousands more stood outside to listen to the speakers. Additionally, 30,000 autoworkers remained away from work, and the Detroit Big Three (General Motors, Ford, Chrysler) automakers halted assembly lines for three minutes to commemorate Reuther. The UAW established a tenor for a follow-up of the crash when it didn’t support a public inquest into the deaths at the Emmett County Airport. Leonard Woodcock, the officer who replaced Reuther after an internal union power struggle, based his decision on a memo written two weeks after the crash by the union’s General Counsel, Stephen Schlossberg.
The National Transportation Safety Board issued its seventeen-page report eight months after the incident. It contains a great deal of data. The NTSB found the probable cause to be the pilot’s inability to visually recognize how low the plane was because of darkness and a faulty altimeter likely to have been reading 225-250 feet higher than the aircraft was. It inexplicably leaves out critical information from the altimeter manufacturer’s investigation and examination issued the same day Stephen Schlossberg wrote his report to Woodcock. Independent journalists and historians have uncritically accepted the consensus opinion that this was an accident.
In 1985, Bill Gallagher, a Detroit reporter from a public television station, filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the FBI for documents on Walter Reuther. Gallagher persisted, and after two years, the Bureau acknowledged having 8400 pages of records, most of which were either redacted or withheld in their entirety.[1] There are some related to the Pellston crash. They, too, are heavily redacted, and the Bureau withheld some in their entirety. In 2022, I submitted my first request for FBI documents related to the Pellston incident. Initially, the Bureau denied my request, claiming no relevant records. However, after I presented them with files previously released to Gallagher in the 1980s, they discovered documents and transferred my request to a Disclosure Analyst. In 2024, they released fourteen pages of records. These included six publicly available newspaper articles and four inconsequential correspondences I already possessed. They removed the redactions from four memos from the FBI’s Detroit Field Office, all sent to Director Hoover within 24 hours of the crash. Other redacted documents released to Gallagher about a “contract” let on Reuther in the months before the plane crash raise concerning questions about the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s involvement in Reuther’s death, and the Bureau refused to declassify those.
In 1992, Walter’s daughter Elisabeth hired David Norris, a private investigator, to investigate the crash after being skeptical of the official explanation. In 2023, Norris told me there was a civil suit related to the crash, but he could not obtain the court documents. In 2024, I managed to get 1286 pages of court documents from a civil suit filed by the Reuther Estate against the Emmett County Airport. These records, along with the recently re-located Kollsman Instrument report on the captain’s altimeter, provide concrete evidence that the deaths in the Pellston plane crash were the result of an assassination.
Walter Reuther was a pivotal figure in American labor history. He served as president of the United Automobile Workers from 1946 to 1970 and played a significant role in shaping the modern labor movement. He is unique among U.S. national union leaders in his dedication to workers’ rights, social justice, internationalism, and civil rights activism.
May 9, 1970
On Saturday evening, May 9, 1970, Walter and Oskar Stonorov agreed to visit the new education center on the shores of Black Lake in rural Michigan for a final inspection. A UAW convention had just voted to name the new facility the Walter P. Reuther Family Education Center. Walter’s wife, May, and a bodyguard, William Wolfman, would accompany them.
The new Black Lake center was located 40 miles east of the Emmet County Airport, which was near the city of Pellston. The UAW had chartered a Learjet (N434EJ) to ferry the party to the airport. It was the identical model, an LJ-23, regularly used by Reuther, the same model that had the dangerous hard landing at Dulles Airport a year and a half before. The flight was scheduled for a 7:30 pm departure from Detroit Wayne County Airport. Stonorov’s Philadelphia flight was delayed, so the other travelers waited at the airport for his arrival.
The Learjet had begun its day at its home base, Columbus (Ohio) Airport. There are no reliable times for the flight between Columbus and Detroit City Airport. N434EJ landed and refueled at Akron, then left that airport at an unknown time, carrying singer Glen Campbell to Detroit City Airport, arriving at 7:00 pm. It debarked Campbell and then made the eighteen straight line mile trip to Detroit Wayne County Airport, reaching it in time for the scheduled 7:30 departure. When Stonorov finally arrived, the group boarded the Lear Jet, and the craft departed Detroit at 8:38 pm.
The Emmet County Airport in Pellston, Michigan, opened in May of 1936. By May of 1970, Emmet County Airport had two paved runways with four separate approach areas. One runway ran southwest to northeast, 5-23, with the southwest end known as Runway 5 and the northeast end known as Runway 23 (All airport runways have numbers corresponding to the runway’s compass alignment–Runway 5 has a 50-degree reading). The approach end of Runway 5 had surrounding terrain as much as 300 feet higher within a quarter mile of the approach. Runway 14-32, running from the southeast to the northwest, was the primary runway at the airport and handled 82% of the air traffic. 14-32 was not operational on May 9, 1970, as an extension was still under construction.
N434EJ was under the control of the Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center. The craft’s pilot, Evans, requested to make a hard left and then a hard right en route to avoid some inclement weather, and permission was given. Minneapolis terminated their radar tracking at 9:14 and advised Evans to contact Pellston by radio. At 20 miles from Pellston, Evans asked for the weather and was told there were scattered clouds at 400 feet. The cloud ceiling was 800 feet with a visibility of seven miles, thunderstorms and light rain, wind varying from 80 degrees to 120 degrees, and intensity varying from 5 to 15 knots. The Flight Station Service (FSS) specialist, Thomas Sorrick, the only person at the airport that evening, asked whether the flight would land straight in on Runway 23 or circle to Runway 5.[2] Evans advised he would decide upon arrival.
At 9:23, Evans reported a procedure turn inbound, a circling motion that would commence a turn to the west instead of making a direct incoming approach at the No. 23 runway. Perhaps the only lighted runway was 5, and there was no option but to circle. At 9:28, Evans announced the runway was in sight, and he was circling for a landing. There was no one to answer this last radio message from Evans because Sorrick had stepped outside to watch the craft before it began to circle.[3] This was bizarre behavior. In a later civil suit, the Airport Manager, Clarence Tatro, testified he had never seen an FSS specialist, including Sorrick, leave his desk to go outside and watch a landing. Sorrick also turned on the Flight Service Station recorder before stepping outside.[4] Tatro later testified that the recorder was used only in emergencies and borderline emergencies. When Sorrick turned on the recorder, the flight was in no trouble.
When N434EJ completed its circling movement, it began a descent to Runway 5. The plane’s first impact with the tree line indicated a path of tree damage 255 feet in length and 45 feet wide. Small parts of the aircraft, including the nose cone, were strewn on the ground under those trees. After the first impact, the plane continued airborne for 15 to 20 seconds (one-half mile or 3000 feet) before striking the trees again and crashing to the ground. The plane erupted into fire, and all the bodies were burned beyond recognition. The craft was nearly completely destroyed. One of the intact sections was the avionics components.
NTSB issued its final report on December 22, 1970, days before the Christmas holiday. It cited the cause of the accident to be:
Pilot visual illusions produced by the lack of visual cues during circling approach over unlighted terrain at night to a runway not equipped with approach lights or other visual approach aids. These illusions made the pilot think he was higher than his true position and were made more acceptable to him because of a strong possibility of an erroneous altimeter [a device used to measure altitude] reading.[5]
The NTSB report does not explain why experienced pilot Evan chose not to use the direct approach landing on Runway 23 and instead circled the airfield and used Runway 5. It was a fatal decision. Runway 5 was the only approach path not equipped with Runway End Identifying Lights (REIL). Runway End Identifier Lights (REIL):
– Placed on both ends of the runway, REILs consist of a pair of synchronized flashing lights.
– They help pilots identify the runway’s end and provide a quick visual reference during the approach.
At the Pellston Airport, there were two REILs, one on each side of every Runway except No. 5. They were placed 40 feet in front of the edge of the Runway. At some time, Runway 5 had been equipped with REILs, but they were removed and moved to Runway 32 in 1967, and on May 9, 1970, No. 5-23 had edge lights that ran along the sides of the runway. Edge lights are white and define the lateral boundaries of the runway.
The Airport
Deposition of Clarence Tatro
February 3, 1973
Clarence Tatro was the first person deposed in the Civil Action of the Reuther Estate v. The County of Emmett. The Reuther Estate attorney, Donald Shely, questioned him. His deposition is approximately 100 pages long.
Tatro was 58 and unemployed at the time of the deposition. He had lived in Pellston most of his life and had an 8th grade education. He had been a machinist in Detroit in the 1930s and, during the war, worked at Ford Willow Run as a foreman, then became a maintenance engineer for Michigan Bakeries and took a job as an Assistant Airport Manager at the Pellston Airport in 1967. Tatro did general airport work, maintenance, and airplane fueling. In early 1968, he became the Airport Manager, overseeing the whole operation of the airport.
Shely questioned Tatro about the airport’s lighting system. He was responsible for the maintenance of the lighting system and did most of the work himself. Shely asks Tatro about a REIL light being burned out on Runway 23 on the night of May 9, 1970. Tatro says he was not told about this at the time. The morning after the crash, Tatro learned from the FAA about the REIL being out on Runway 23 and investigated. Tatro said, “I think I changed the tube in it or something of that nature.” There were both bulbs and tubes in the REILs. The FAA should have been informed about this outage but wasn’t. Tatro explained it was his responsibility to notify the FAA that a REIL was out. Shely asks Tatro what would happen if a REIL went out at 2:00 a.m. Tatro answers that the FAA would release a NOTEM (notice to pilot). Pilot Evans was not informed about the REIL being out.
Evan’s fatal decision to circle to land at Runway 5 became a subject of interest in Shely’s questioning of Tatro. Tatro finally had an opportunity to speak with the FSS specialist Sorrick at about 11:00 pm the evening of the crash:
Q: Was there any discussion about the favored runway?
A Not to my knowledge.
Q Did you have any information as to what had been the favored runway at the time you discussed this matter with him?
A Yes, but I don’t know where I received it.
Q What was your information?
A That runway 5 was favored.
Q It is quite important to me, sir, to ask you where you obtained that information.
A I can’t recall.
Q Did you by any chance obtain it from Mr. Sorrick?
A I could have.
Q Well, if you in fact did, did he indicate whether he had advised the pilot that that was the favored runway?
Mr. Stroup (attorney for Emmet County Airport): I will object to the question on the ground that it is merely calling for speculation from the witness, who has already testified that he doesn’t recall.
Mr. Shely: If he can’t answer it he may say so, but if he can I would like his answer.
A I can’t. That is too far away for specific details
Q Weren’t you anxious to find out how it happened?
A Yes, very much.
Q Didn’t you attempt to obtain information from Mr. Sorrick as to how it happened?
A That is possible.
Q And didn’t you in fact obtain some information from Mr. Sorrick as to what he knew about the event at the time you talked with him?
A It is possible he told me.
Q Is it only possible, or did you in fact?
A I can’t recall.
Q Mr. Sorrick seems to have some trouble with his recollection. In any event, you can’t tell us whether or not Mr. Sorrick indicated to you that evening that he had advised the pilot that 5 was the favored runway; is that right?
A No, I can’t.[6]
The most viable explanation for why Evans began circling the airport without any recorded conversation with Sorrick or without being notified of the faulty REIL on Runway 23 is that only the Runway 5 portion of the lights were on. Tatro tells Shely that the pilots requested what lights they wanted to be turned on before landing and that not half the lights went on in one direction and the other half in the other. Journalist Michael Parenti investigated the crash in 1995 and wrote that pilot Evans attempted to land at the only lighted runway.[7]
Tatro attested that the NTSB had not questioned him about the runway lights. The only questions they asked him concerned the fire truck. After the plane crashed at 9:33, Sorrick did not call Tatro, the Airport Manager, but Gary Sobleski, an agent for North Central Airlines, a regional carrier. Sobleski called Tatro and told him an airplane went off the end of Runway 5. Tatro hurried to the airport and got the facility’s fire truck, equipped with foam for aircraft fires. In his deposition, Tatro asks, “Why would anybody [Sorrick?] call a City Fire Department with nothing but water on it for an aircraft fire? You put water on kerosene, and it makes it worse.”
Tatro and Sobleski arrived at the airport at about 9:45 pm. They searched the area southwest of the airport, believing that a plane had landed on Runway 23 and overshot it going off the end of Runway 5, as that is what Sobleski was told. They finally ended up at the crash site, but the local Sheriff told them it was all over and they weren’t needed. Tatro explains, “…I feel as though I could have saved more of the wreckage, and I could have kept the bodies from being burned as much as they were if I had been called properly.” Tatro arrived at the airport at about 11:00 or 11:30 pm and engaged with Sorrick, testifying, “Well, I don’t think he told me anything that happened. I think I kind of bawled him out a little bit, or something like that, for not notifying me first.”
Some of the equipment at the airport, like the VOR, was the responsibility of the FAA. VOR stands for VHF Omni-directional Range. It’s a radio navigation system used by aircraft for short-to-medium-range navigation. VORs provide pilots with a reliable means to determine their position and stay on course. The Pellston Airport VOR ran on commercial electric power, but if that failed, the FAA maintained a backup generator, which would automatically come on. During the deposition of Tatro, Shely queries,” Did you ever learn, sir, that the VOR had been alarming that evening? Did that information ever come to your attention?” Tatro: “No.” An alarm goes off when the VOR malfunctions and goes off the air, another problem plaguing the Pellston airport that fateful evening.
The NTSB found that visual illusions at nighttime were a cause of the crash. When questioned about this, Tatro, a pilot himself, says, “Well you have no visual reference on the ground to give you depth perception…you have to rely on your instruments.” The instrument Evans had to rely on was his altimeter. Astonishingly, the captain’s altimeter survived the smashup and resulting fire. When examined, it would show that the altimeter was reading over 200 feet too high at the time because of subtle defects. Parts of the critical information from the manufacturer’s examination were omitted from the NTSB report, and the FBI, responsible for an investigation, failed to do one.
The Altimeter
Deposition of William B. Weston
July 24, 1973
William B. Weston, an investigator for the NTSB, was deposed in the Civil Action of the Reuther Estate v. The County of Emmett (Civil Action No. 173-3) beginning on July 24, 1973, in Washington D.C. It concluded on July 26. He was also examined by the counsel for Plaintiff Stonorov (Oskar’s wife Betty) in civil action numbers 71-1091, 72-784, 73-984, 73-985, and 73-986 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Present during the three days of examination were attorneys for the Plaintiffs; the Reuther Estate, Stonorov, Wolfman and Defendants Executive Jet Aviation, Instruments and Flight Research, Col-Aire Inc. (the President of Col-Aire was in attendance), and Gates-Learjet Corp., Also in attendance were attorneys for the NTSB and the FAA. The Emmett County attorney did not make it under protest. The deposition is approximately 350 pages long.[8]
The Learjet Corporation manufactured the aircraft destroyed at the Pellston airport and Executive Jet Aviation leased it. According to the Executive Jet Aviation maintenance log, the altimeter was remanufactured by Instruments and Flight Research and overhauled by Col-Aire when it was found to be out of tolerance in September of 1969. A problem for the Plaintiffs here is that there is no evidence that the altimeter found at the crash site was the same one in the maintenance log. The evidence shows it was not the same one.
The NTSB interpreted rules to prohibit the giving of expert opinion testimony in civil suits for damages and read a statement on this. The parties reached some sort of stipulation off the record concerning this. Stonorov’s counsel called Weston. Weston was an Air Safety Investigator for the NTSB. He worked for United Airlines for 13 years as a systems specialist and had worked for the NTSB since 1967.
Weston was the System Group Chairman of the NTSB investigation of the May 9 crash. The investigation was divided among various groups. The crash happened at 9:33 pm on May 9. Traveling from the Washington D.C. area, Weston arrived at the site the following morning at 11:00 am on May 10. An initial look at the path the plane cut through the treetops indicated that the N434EJ path was lower than desired. This suggested to Weston that it likely was an instrument misreading or an instrument faulty indication that caused the pilot to be lower than he thought. Weston then found the captain’s altimeter in the destroyed cabin area. He pulled it out of the still-warm wreckage.
Weston also recovered the aircraft’s pitot-static system, which is its plumbing system, and sent it to the FBI for testing. He received a report back from the FBI that said there was nothing suspicious about it. (In the course of two FOIA requests to the FBI on the Pellston incident, they never admitted to having these records.)
Weston took the altimeter to Barfield Instrument Company in Miami, Florida, for examination. It was under his control the entire time. Before Barfield examined the altimeter, Weston took it to Pan American Airlines, where they could X-ray it as Barfield did not have the necessary equipment. Weston testified that the serial number on the captain’s altimeter was S/N 078, but the serial number came from Executive Jet’s maintenance records. No identification was visible on the altimeter.
Barfield and Kollsman Examination
The X-ray proved to be important. Barfield technicians cut into the altimeter with a hack saw and delicately peeled the case off. A brass screw was missing from the rocking shaft, and they found it in the case with aluminum deposits on it. At the time the X-rays were taken the screw was in the proper hole. The hole was aluminum and gave indications the threads were torn out. Barfield found the altimeter also had a loose end stone and a loose jewel in the movement. (I understand that the jewel is like those in watches). There was also heat damage and some damage from impact. Barfield noted the observations and packaged it in plastic envelopes for Weston to take. Barfield identified it as a basic Kollsman Type 2206. Weston brought the altimeter back to his office in Washington, where it remained locked for a week at his desk.
Weston then took the altimeter to Kollsman Instruments in Elmhurst, New York for further examination and testing on May 26 and 27. They took photos throughout the examination of the altimeter. Weston testified that Kollsman found, “Concerning the condition of the set screw, it appeared that the threads in the hole were torn, and I think that’s pretty visible on [photos] 24,25…there’s deformation of the threads…” Shaft A has the missing ring stone in the rear of the shaft, photo 37. Shaft A to the capsule, is the link which had the improper link pin in the spring pin on the capsule….it would put an unnatural torque on the thing…it was a pin, but it was out of another altimeter….The forward jewel for this shaft was damaged, photo 38….The forward endstone for Shaft B was put in the mechanism backwards….One of the pivots which supports the rear of the rocking shaft was incorrect in that it is intended for a ring stone application only.”
Kollsman constructed an identical model with the same abnormalities and found, “If the questionable calibration arm set screws were loose at the time of approach under concern, the instrument would probably have indicated high by roughly 225 to 250 feet.” In his deposition, Weston concurred with this. He attached the Kollsman findings to his final report to the NTSB Board.
Military Altimeter
In response to a question from Dillman, the FAA attorney, and with the agreement of the other attorneys, Weston reads from the Kollsman report:
No identification was present to trace the specific instrument. The mechanismic [sic] construction isolated the unit to one of three major types each of which had numerous variations none of which were TSO [Technical Standards Order a federal aviation regulation] certified. All of these types were essentially military.[9]
Inexplicably, none of this information made it into the NTSB Board’s final report on the Pellston crash. The Board’s report included the Kollsman test results showing that the altimeter was likely reading 225-250 feet too high, and they listed all the wrong, misassembled, and damaged parts but not the summary. The report discusses the altimeter as if it is the one identified in Executive Jet’s maintenance log, though Kollsman found no identifying marks. There is no discussion about how such a poorly manufactured altimeter, made for the military, came out of Col-Aire, the last organization to handle it according to the maintenance log, and could have functioned properly for six months. Weston had no evidence that Col-Aire had incorrectly assembled, repaired, or inspected the altimeter.
Sabotage
On the second day of testimony, while objecting, the FAA attorney, Dillman, stated, “I’m representing the United States government, and to whatever extent that applies to the NTSB—I’m not prepared to state whether that includes the NTSB.” The NTSB had its attorney present.
The following day, Dillman asks Weston if his group, the Systems Group, would specifically look for evidence of sabotage. Weston answers, “No, sir. I think that falls into the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”
Q May I assume then that when you had your organizational meeting and you discussed, to whatever you discussed areas that you were going to concentrate on or set your priorities, that sabotage was not one of the items that you were primarily looking for or at any rate it was somewhere way down on the list of priorities?
A We never rule out the possibility of sabotage. If we do—and I don’t believe it was discussed at least by my group. I am sure there must have been an FBI man there and there always is in the case of a fire or crash. It’s one of the considerations that is discussed by the investigator in charge.
Q: Was there an FBI agent?
A I don’t remember. I think there was, but I don’t remember.” (Discussion off the record)
Q Mr. Weston, with regard to what your counsel has just explained to us, did you say previously that FBI agents normally appear at NTSB investigations?
A Yes.
Q But you don’t recall in this instance whether or not there was one or there wasn’t?
A Vaguely, I remember but like I said that there’s been a lot of accidents since then.
Q Would an FBI agent’s participation in this investigation or any investigation be independent of the Board’s inquiry, or would he be considered part of the NTSB investigating team?
A I believe he would be independent.
Mr. Paffel (NTSB attorney) Yes
A Yes
Q May I assume there probably would be no record in the NTSB docket, and probably no record in the files of the NTSB of an FBI agent?
A That would be a good assumption.
The NTSB field investigators faced a dilemma investigating possible sabotage. This was an area reserved for the FBI. Weston sought other explanations for the anomalies in the altimeter. His testimony on the set screw is an example of this. The Kollsman Instrument report that he referenced had photos. Concerning the condition of the set screw hole, Weston says, “It appeared that the threads in the hole were torn, and I think that’s pretty visible on [photos] 24,25…there’s deformation of the threads.” Weston states, “It was caused by the heat.” Kollsman tested a similar altimeter, heating it to 1100 degrees (F) for two hours. The set screw did not come loose, and the threads were not damaged.
When asked about any other abnormal condition with the shaft besides the tearing of the threads, Weston replies, “…on picture No. 24, there’s an indentation, and at the time, we were worried as to whether that was some sort of an indentation caused by a drill bit or something, and in testing this other one, we found that the heat causes this metal to puck.” In an answer to another attorney, Weston says: “Yes. I repeat, as I said a little earlier, there’s a slight indentation which was rather curious in that it appeared to look like a drill had been started into the area.”
Occam’s Razor principle suggests that among competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest assumptions should be selected. I asked for the Kollsman report in a FOIA request with the NTSB in 2018, and they denied having it. Maverick journalist A.J. Weberman found the Kollsman report in 1992 at the NTSB archives in Washington D.C. (he shared a copy with me) and wrote that the most likely explanation was that a drill had been used on the altimeter. It made the indentation, and then when the bit was put in the set screw hole, it tore out the aluminum threads. The set screw was placed back in the hole (where it remained at the time it was X-rayed for Barfield). But on the flight to Pellston, the torque and friction from all the wrong and misassembled parts slowly began pulling it out, causing the altimeter to read 225-250 feet too high when the jet attempted to land.[10]
According to the Emmett County Court documents, this legal issue of the suit was resolved amicably out of court on October 9, 1975, days before it was scheduled to go to trial. In 1975, Elisabeth Reuther received a settlement of $6,569 from the Pellston Airport.[11]
[1] During negotiations over my FOIA request in 2023, the FBI informed me that another individual had requested declassification of all 8,400 documents, which were sent to a Disclosure Analyst. They estimated it would take six or seven years.
[2] Sorrick was not deposed in the civil action against the airport.
[3] National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident Report Executive Jet Aviation Inc. Lear Jet L23A N434EJ Near Emmet County Airport Pellston, Mi May 9, 1970. State of Michigan for the Circuit Court of the County of Emmet, Irving J. Bluestone, Administrator with the Will Annexed of Walter P. Reuther and Irving J. Bluestone, Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of May W. Reuther Civil Action No. 173-3 Deposition of Clarence Tatro
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] State of Michigan for the Circuit Court of the County of Emmet, Irving J. Bluestone, Administrator with the Will Annexed of Walter P. Reuther and Irving J. Bluestone, Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of May W. Reuther Civil Action No. 173-3 Deposition of Clarence Tatro
[7] Parenti and Norton, “The Wonderful Life and Strange Death of Walter Reuther,” Covert Action Quarterly, 1995 No. 54, p.42
[8] State of Michigan for the Circuit Court of the County of Emmet, Irving J. Bluestone, Administrator with the Will Annexed of Walter P. Reuther and Irving J. Bluestone, Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of May W. Reuther Civil Action No. 173-3 Deposition of William B. Weston.
[9] State of Michigan for the Circuit Court of the County of Emmet, Irving J. Bluestone, Administrator with the Will Annexed of Walter P. Reuther and Irving J. Bluestone, Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of May W. Reuther Civil Action No. 173-3 Deposition of William B. Weston.
[10] A.J. Weberman, DID NIXON RUN A DOMESTIC OPERATION PHOENIX? FATAL “ACCIDENTS” DURING THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION. https://educationforum.ipbhost.com/topic/15078-was-joe-biden-the-target-of-a-botched-assassination-attempt-by-cia%E2%80%99s-domestic-operation-phoenix-component/?tab=comments#comment-175317
[11] Email from Bruce Dickmeyer 2024.
About the Author
Author Name: Rob McKenzie
Rob McKenzie
Education
Bachelor of Arts
University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA (1974)
Diploma in Industrial Electronics
St. Paul College, St. Paul, MN (1985)
UAW-Ford Apprenticeship Program
Industrial Electrician Certification (1994)
Professional Licenses
Minnesota Journeyman A Electrical License (1994-2006)
Publications
Book:
El Golpe: U.S. Labor the CIA and the Coup at Ford in Mexico
Pluto Press (2022)
Article:
“CIA Spied on Mexican Revolutionary Workers Party, Interfered in Union Elections, and Collaborated With Anti-Union Thugs Who Broke Up Strike at Ford Cuautitlán Assembly Plant Thirty-Three Years Ago”
Covert Action Magazine (February 11, 2023)
“Covert Partners: Labor Unions, the CIA, and Cold War Empire A Review of Blue Collar Empire”
The Journal of Labor and Society (1st Quarter 2025)
Work Experience
Auto Assembler (Ford Motor Co.)1976 – 1987
UAW District Committee 1987-1990
Industrial Electrician 1990-1998
President UAW 879 1998-2006
UAW International Regional Servicing Representative 2006-2016
Boards and Leadership
Minnesota State AFL-CIO Executive Board 2002-2014
Secretary-Treasurer UAW Ford Sub Council #2 (National Bargaining Council of Ford Assembly Plants) 2002-2006
Trustee St. Paul Regional Labor Federation 2005- 2012
Email: rmckenz2@comcast.net
Phone: 6122752675
Mailing Address:
528 Locust St
Hudson, WI 54016